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1Secrecy and Energy Efficiency in Massive MIMO Aided
Heterogeneous C-RAN: A New Look at Interference
Lifeng Wang, Kai-Kit Wong, Maged Elkashlan, Arumugam Nallanathan, and Sangarapillai Lambotharan
Abstract—In this paper, we investigate the potential benefits
of the massive multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) enabled
heterogeneous cloud radio access network (C-RAN) in terms of
the secrecy and energy efficiency (EE). In this network, both
remote radio heads (RRHs) and massive MIMO macrocell base
stations (BSs) are deployed and soft fractional frequency reuse
(S-FFR) is adopted to mitigate the inter-tier interference. We
first examine the physical layer security by deriving the area
ergodic secrecy rate and secrecy outage probability. Our results
reveal that the use of massive MIMO and C-RAN can greatly
improve the secrecy performance. For C-RAN, a large number
of RRHs achieves high area ergodic secrecy rate and low secrecy
outage probability, due to its powerful interference management.
We find that for massive MIMO aided macrocells, having more
antennas and serving more users improves secrecy performance.
Then we derive the EE of the heterogeneous C-RAN, illustrating
that increasing the number of RRHs significantly enhances the
network EE. Furthermore, it is indicated that allocating more
radio resources to the RRHs can linearly increase the EE of
RRH tier and improve the network EE without affecting the EE
of the macrocells.
Index Terms—Heterogeneous cloud radio access network (C-
RAN), massive MIMO, soft fractional frequency reuse (S-FFR),
physical layer security, energy efficiency.
I. INTRODUCTION
As a new mobile network architecture consisting of remote
radio heads (RRHs) and baseband units (BBUs), cloud radio
access network (C-RAN) can deal with large-scale control/data
processing much more efficiently. The rationale behind this is
that baseband processing is centralized and coordinated among
sites in the centralized BBU pool, which reduces the capi-
tal expenditure (CAPEX) and operating expenditure (OPEX)
of the networks [1]. Massive multiple-input multiple-output
(MIMO) is another key technology that promises outstanding
spectral efficiency (SE) and energy efficiency (EE). In massive
MIMO antenna systems, base stations (BSs) are equipped with
large antenna arrays to support a large number of users in
the same time-frequency domain [2]. Among other emerging
technologies such as device-to-device communications, full
duplex radios, and millimeter wave, etc., C-RAN and massive
MIMO are identified as promising 5G technologies [3–5].
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Driven by its high SE and EE, C-RAN has recently received
tremendous attention from both industry and academia [5, 6].
For instance, a group of single-antenna RRHs were considered
to form a distributed antenna array, and two downlink trans-
mission strategies namely best RRH selection and distributed
beamforming were examined in terms of outage probability in
[6]. Most recently in [7], user-centric association in a multi-
tier C-RAN was proposed, in which the RRH that had the
best signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) was scheduled to serve the
user. Compared to [6], downlink transmission in the C-RAN
with a group of multi-antenna RRHs was investigated in [8].
In the work of [8], maximal ratio transmission and transmit
antenna selection were adopted at the RRHs, and the outage
probability was derived by considering several transmission
schemes such as RRH selection and distributed beamforming.
Heterogeneous C-RAN is a new paradigm by integrating
cloud computing with heterogeneous networks (HetNets) [9,
10]. In heterogeneous C-RAN, severe inter-tier interference
is coordinated for the enhancement of SE and EE. The
architecture of heterogenous C-RAN with massive MIMO
is envisioned as an appealing solution, since none of these
techniques can solely achieve the 5G targets [4, 9]. In [9], the
opportunities and challenges for heterogenous C-RAN with
massive MIMO were discussed, and it was mentioned that
the proper densities of the massive MIMO macrocell BSs
(MBSs) and RRHs in the networks should be addressed. While
the significance of heterogenous C-RAN with massive MIMO
has been highlighted in the prior works [5, 9], more research
efforts should be devoted to proper characterization of this
combination.
Although C-RAN can effectively mitigate the inter-RRH in-
terference by using interference management techniques such
as coordinated multi-point (CoMP), the inter-tier interference
between the RRHs and MBSs may be problematic in the
heterogeneous C-RAN, due to the limited radio resources.
Soft fractional frequency reuse (S-FFR) is viewed as an
efficient inter-tier interference coordination approach. In [10],
S-FFR was considered in the heterogeneous C-RAN to both
mitigate the inter-tier interference and enhance the spectrum
efficiency.
Recent developments have showed physical layer security
as an innovative solution for safeguarding wireless networks.
The rationale behind this is to exploit the randomness inherent
in wireless channels such as fading or artificial noise, etc. in
order to transmit information confidentially [11]. In contrast
to traditional cryptographic approaches, physical layer security
based techniques do not rely on computational complexity
and have very good scalability [12]. The emergence of mas-
sive MIMO also introduces new opportunities for providing
2physical layer security, e.g., [12–14]. In particular, in [13],
matched filter precoding and artificial noise generation were
considered to secure downlink transmission in a multicell
massive MIMO system in the presence of an eavesdropper.
Subsequently in [14], passive eavesdropping and active attacks
were investigated in massive MIMO systems with physical
layer security, which illustrates that passive eavesdropping has
little effect on the secrecy capacity for the case of considering
only one single-antenna eavesdropper. While these recent con-
tributions certainly laid a solid foundation in massive MIMO
systems with physical layer security, such a research area is
still far from being well understood. The research on physical
layer security in the C-RAN is also in its infancy, and we
believe it is a new highly rewarding candidate for physical
layer security due to at least the following two crucial factors:
 Low-power RRHs are densely placed in C-RAN [1] so
the distance between user and its serving RRH is short,
which decreases the risk of information leakage.
 The inter-RRH interference is mitigated in the C-RAN.
As such, all other RRHs can act as “friendly jammers”
to confound the eavesdroppers [15–18].
Thus, massive MIMO and C-RAN offer a wealth of opportu-
nities at the physical layer to secure communication.
Motivated by the aforementioned background, in this paper,
we explore the benefits of massive MIMO aided heterogeneous
C-RAN by investigating its secrecy and EE performance. We
consider downlink transmission in a two-tier heterogeneous
C-RAN, in which the RRHs co-exist with the massive MIMO
aided macrocells. To control the inter-tier interference to an
acceptable level, S-FFR is used to allocate the radio resources
appropriately. Different from [10, 13, 14], in this paper, the
RRHs and massive MIMO MBSs are spatially distributed
under the framework of stochastic geometry. While [6, 8]
considered only one single user in the network with multiple
RRHs around the user coverage area and evaluated the perfor-
mance from the standpoint of the user, we analyze the secrecy
and EE of the entire network. In summary, our contributions
are that:
 We provide a tractable analytical framework to charac-
terize the secrecy and EE performance of heterogeneous
C-RAN aided by massive MIMO. Our analysis accounts
for the key features of massive MIMO and C-RAN, i.e.,
large antenna arrays and simultaneously serving multiple
users for massive MIMO, and large numbers of RRHs
and inter-RRH interference mitigation for C-RAN.
 We also study the area ergodic secrecy rate and secrecy
outage probability in this network. Our results illustrate
that accommodating more users by the massive MIMO
empowered MBSs increases the area ergodic secrecy rate
and decreases the secrecy outage probability, while it
has negligible effect on the RRH’s secrecy performance.
Deploying large numbers of RRHs increases the area
ergodic secrecy rate and decreases the secrecy outage
probability.
 In addition, our results demonstrate that the effect of S-
FFR on the area ergodic secrecy rate of the network can
be distinct depending on the RRH density. Moreover, the
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Fig. 1. An illustration of two-tier heterogeneous C-RAN, where the red
dash lines represent the backhual links between the macrocell base stations
and BBU pool via X2/S1 interfaces, and the green solid lines represent the
fronthaul links between the RRHs and BBU pool via optical fiber link.
EE of the RRH tier linearly increases with their dedicated
radio resources, and the network EE is improved by using
more RRHs and more radio resources to be allocated to
the RRHs.
II. SYSTEM DESCRIPTIONS
A. Network Model
As shown in Fig. 1, we consider the downlink of a two-tier
heterogeneous C-RAN, where the BBU pool in the cloud is
established to coordinate the entire network. Massive MIMO
enabled MBSs of the first tier, as high power nodes (HPNs),
are connected with the BBU pool via backhaul link, while
the RRHs of the second tier, as low power nodes (LPNs), are
connected with the BBU pool via fronthaul link (optical fibre
link). In this model, we have eavesdroppers (Eves) passively
intercepting the secrecy messages without any active attacks.
The locations of Eves are modeled as a homogeneous Poisson
point process (HPPP) e with density e.1 On the other hand,
the locations of MBSs are modeled as an independent HPPP
M with density M, and we model the locations of RRHs by
an independent HPPP R with density R.
Equipped with NM antennas, each MBS uses zero-forcing
beamforming (ZFBF) to communicate with S single-antenna
users over the same resource block (RB) (NM  S  1)
using equal power assignment. The ZFBF matrix at a MBS
isW=G
 
GHG
 1
with the channel matrix G [20], here H
denotes the Hermitian transpose. Each RRH is equipped with
a single-antenna and serves a single-antenna user over one RB.
1In practice, the behavior of users is unknown and they can also act as
malicious Eves, therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the locations of
Eves follow PPP [19].
3All channels are assumed to undergo independent identically
distributed (i.i.d.) quasi-static Rayleigh block fading. Further,
each user is assumed to be connected with its nearest BS such
that the Euclidean plane is divided into Poisson-Voronoi cells.
We consider the adoption of S-FFR for inter-tier interference
mitigation and assume that there are a total of K RBs, the
number of RBs allocated to RRHs is K, and the number
of RBs shared by RRHs and MBSs is (1  )K, in which
 denotes the S-FFR factor, with (0    1). Since inter-
RRH interference can be efficiently mitigated via cooperation
among RRHs, same radio resources can be shared among the
RRHs in the C-RAN [10]. For RRH transmission over the k-th
RB allocated to RRHs, the receive signal-to-interference-plus-
noise ratio (SINR) at a typical user can be expressed as
R;k =
PR
BoNo
hR;k jXo;Rj R ; k = 1; : : : ; K (1)
where PR is the RRH transmit power allocated to each RB,
Bo is the bandwidth per RB, hR;k  exp(1) is the small-
scale fading channel power gain,  is the frequency dependent
constant value, which is typically set as ( c4fc )
2 with c =
3 108m=s, R is the pathloss exponent, jXo;Rj denotes the
distance between the typical user and its typical serving RRH,
and No is the power spectrum density of the noise and the
weak inter-RRH interference. For RRH transmission over the
-th RB shared by the RRHs and MBSs, the receive SINR at
a typical user is written as
R; =
PRhR; jXo;Rj R
IM; +BoNo
;  = 1; : : : ; (1  )K (2)
where hR;  exp(1) is the small-scale fading channel power
gain, IM; is the inter-tier interference from the MBSs, which
is given by
IM; =
X
`2M
PM
S
h`; jX`;Mj M ; (3)
where PM is the MBS transmit power of each RB, h`; 
  (S; 1)2 is the small-scale fading interfering channel power
gain, jX`;Mj is the distance between the interfering MBS ` 2
M and the typical user, and M is the pathloss exponent.
We consider the non-colluding eavesdropping scenario
where the most malicious Eve i.e., the one with the largest
SINR of the received signal, dominates the secrecy rate [11].
Thus, for RRH transmissions over the k-th and -th RB, the
receive SINRs at the most malicious Eve e are given by
e

R;k = max
e2e
(
PRh
e
R;k
Xeo;R R
IeR;k +BoNe
)
; (4)
and
e

R; = max
e2e
(
PRh
e
R;
Xeo;R R
IeR; + I
e
M; +BoNe
)
; (5)
respectively, where heR;i(i 2 fk; g)  exp(1) and
Xeo;R are
the small-scale fading eavesdropping channel power gain and
the distance between the typical serving RRH and the Eve
2  (; ) is the upper incomplete gamma function [21, (8.350)].
e 2 e, respectively, Ne is the noise power spectrum density,
IeR;i and I
e
M; are the interference from the RRHs and MBSs,
which are found as8>>><>>>:
IeR;i =
X
j2R=o
PRh
e
j;i
Xej;R R ;
IeM; =
X
`2M
PM
S
he`;
Xe`;M M ; (6)
where hej;i  exp(1) and
Xej;R are the small-scale fading
interfering channel power gain and the distance between the
RRH j 2 R=o (except the typical serving RRH) and the Eve,
respectively, he`;    (S; 1) [20] and
Xe`;M are the small-
scale fading interfering channel power gain and the distance
between the MBS ` 2 M and the Eve, respectively.
Due to the limited backhaul capacity, the inter-MBS in-
terference is assumed to be not mitigated. Thus, for MBS
transmission over the -th RB shared by RRHs and MBSs,
the receive SINR at a typical user is written as
M; =
PM
S gM; jXo;Mj M
JM; + JR; +BoN1
; (7)
where gM;    (NM   S + 1; 1) is the small-scale fading
channel power gain, jXo;Mj is the distance between the typical
user and its typical serving MBS, N1 is the power spectrum
density of the noise. In (7), JM; and JR; are the interference
from MBSs and RRHs, which are given by8>>><>>>:
JM; =
X
`2M=o
PM
S
g`; jX`;Mj M ;
JR; =
X
j2R
PRgj; jXj;Rj R ;
(8)
where g`;    (S; 1) and jX`;Mj are the small-scale fading
interfering channel power gain and the distance between the
interfering MBS ` 2 M=o (except the typical serving MBS)
and the typical user, respectively, gj;  exp (1) and jXj;Rj are
the small-scale interfering channel power gain and the distance
between the interfering RBS j 2 R and the typical user,
respectively.
Similar to (5), for MBS transmission, the receive SINR e

M;
at the most malicious Eve e is given by
e

M; = max
e2e
(
PM
S g
e
M;
Xeo;M M
JeM; + J
e
R; +BoNe
)
; (9)
where geM;  exp (1) and
Xeo;M are the small-scale fading
channel power gain and distance between the typical serving
MBS and the Eve, respectively. In particular, we consider
the worst-case scenario that Eves are capable of mitigating
the intra-cell interference [19]. In (9), JeM; and J
e
R; are the
interference from the MBSs and RRHs, respectively, given by8>>><>>>:
JeM; =
X
`2M=o
PM
S
ge`;
Xe`;M M ;
JeR; =
X
j2R
PRg
e
j;
Xej;R R ; (10)
4CR;k =
2
ln 2
(R + M)
Z 1
0
e
BoNo
PR
xR
 

0;
BoNo
PR
xR

xe (R+M)x
2
dx; (13)
CR; =
2
ln 2
(R + M)
Z 1
0
"Z 1
0
FR; jfjXo;Rj=xg ()
1 + 
d
#
xe (R+M)x
2
dx; (14)
with
FR; jfjXo;Rj=xg () =e
 BoNoPR x
R
exp

  M2
SX
=1

S


xRPM
PRS
xRPM
PRS
 + 2M
M
B
  x
R MPM
PRS
   2
M
; 1  S

(15)
where ge`;    (S; 1) and
Xe`;M are the small-scale fading
interfering channel power gain and the distance between the
interfering MBS ` 2 M=o (except the typical serving MBS)
and Eve, respectively, and gej;  exp (1) and
Xej;R are
the small-scale fading interfering channel power gain and
the distance between the interfering RRH j 2 R and Eve,
respectively.
B. Power Consumption Model
The total power consumption at each RRH is given by
P totalR = K
PR
"R
+ P 0R + Pfh; (11)
in which "R is the efficiency of the power amplifier, P 0R is
the static hardware power consumption of the RRH, and Pfh
denotes the power consumption of the fronthaul link.
We employ a general massive MIMO power consumption
model proposed in [22], which can clearly specify how the
power scales with the number of antennas and active users
in each macrocell. Thus, the total power consumption at each
MBS is found as
P totalM =(1  )K
PM
"M
+
3X
=1
 
(S)

;0
+ (S)
( 1)
NM;1

+ P 0M + Pbh; (12)
where "M (0 < "M  1) is the efficiency of the power ampli-
fier, the parameters ;0 and ;1 depend on the transceiver
chains, coding and decoding, precoding, etc., which are de-
tailed in Section V, P 0M is the MBS’s static hardware power
consumption, and Pbh is the power consumption of the back-
haul link.
III. SECRECY PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, the effects of massive MIMO and C-RAN
on the secrecy performance are studied in terms of both the
area ergodic secrecy rate and secrecy outage probability.
Secrecy outage probability captures the probability of both
reliability and secrecy for one transmission.
A. Area Ergodic Secrecy Rate
Area ergodic secrecy rate represents the secrecy capacity
limitation of the network, which allows us to investigate the
impacts of different densities of RRHs and massive MIMO
macrocells on the network secrecy performance. We first study
the ergodic capacity of the channel between the typical RRH
and its served user, which is given as follows.
Theorem 1. When using the k-th RB allocated to the RRHs,
the ergodic capacity CR;k of the channel between the typical
RRH and its served user is derived as (13) (see top of this
page). When using the -th RB shared by the RRHs and MBSs,
the ergodic capacity CR; of the channel between the typical
RRH and its served user is derived as (14), where B() [; ] is
the incomplete beta function [21, (8.391)]. 3
Proof: A detailed proof is provided in Appendix A.
We next derive the ergodic capacity of the channel between
the most malicious eavesdropper and the typical RRH, which
is given as follows:
Theorem 2. For RRH transmissions over the k-th RB and
-th RB, the ergodic capacity Ce

R;k and C
e
R; of the most
malicious eavesdropper’s channel are derived as (16) and
(18), respectively, in the next page.
Proof: A detailed proof is provided in Appendix B.
Based on Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 , using Jensen’s
inequality that E fmax (X;Y )g  max (E fxg ;E fY g), the
ergodic secrecy rate for the typical RRH transmission over
the k-th RB is lower bounded as [13, 23]
RsR;k =
h
CR;k   CeR;k
i+
; (20)
where [x]+ = max fx; 0g.
Likewise, the ergodic secrecy rate for the typical RRH
transmission over the -th RB is lower bounded as
RsR; =
h
CR;   CeR;
i+
: (21)
Remark 2: From the results in Theorem 1, Theorem 2,
(20) and (21), we realize that the ergodic secrecy rate for
3Note that the special functions such as incomplete beta function have been
included in the commonly-used mathematical softwares such as Mathematic
and Matlab, and can be directly calculated.
5Ce

R;k =
1
ln 2
Z 1
0
1  FeR;k (x)
1 + x
dx; (16)
with
FeR;k
(x) = exp

  2e
Z 1
0
exp
h
  r
Rx
PR
BoNe   R 

1 +
2
R

 

1  2
R
 
rRx
 2
R
i
rdr

(17)
Ce

R; =
1
ln 2
Z 1
0
1  FeR; (x)
1 + x
dx; (18)
with
FeR;
(x) = exp

  2e
Z 1
0
exp
h
  r
Rx
PR
BoNe   R 

1 +
2
R

 

1  2
R
 
rRx
 2
R
  2M
SX
=1

S


rRxPM
PRS
 2
M  

  2M

 

 + 2M + S

M  (S)
i
rdr

(19)
FeM;
(x) = exp

  2e
Z 1
0
exp

  Sr
Mx
PM
B0N1   R (PR)
2
R  

1 +
2
R

 

1  2
R

SrMx
PM
 2
R
  2M
SX
=1

S


(rMx)
2
M
 

  2M

 

 + 2M + S

M  (S)
#
rdr
)
(25)
RRH transmission increases with the density of RRHs, which
can be explained by the facts that: 1) When deploying more
RRHs in the same area, the distance between the legitimate
user and its associated RRH is shorter, which decreases the
pathloss; and 2) more interference from RRHs is present at the
eavesdroppers, which degrades the eavesdropping channel.
The area ergodic secrecy rate (in bits/s/m2) of the RRH tier
in the heterogeneous C-RAN is calculated as
RsR = R
 
KBoR
s
R;k + (1  )KBoRsR;

: (22)
For MBS transmission, we have a tractable lower bound
expression for the ergodic capacity of the channel between
the typical MBS and its serving user as stated in the following
theorem.
Theorem 3. For MBS transmission over the -th RB, the
ergodic capacity of the channel between the typical MBS and
its served user is lower bounded in a closed-form as
CLM; = log2
 
1 + exp

ln

PM
S


+  (NM   S + 1)  M
2
( (1)  ln ( (R + M)))  ln
 PM2M   2  M2 
(M   2) (M + R)1 
M
2
+
PR2R 
 
2  R2

(R   2) (M + R)1 
R
2
+BoN1
!
; (23)
where  () is the digamma function [24]. For very large NM,
 (NM   S + 1)  ln (NM   S + 1) [25].
Proof: A detailed proof is provided in Appendix C.
For MBS transmission over the -th RB, the ergodic ca-
pacity Ce

M; of the most malicious eavesdropper’s channel is
derived as
Ce

M; = E
n
log2

1 + e

M;
o
=
1
ln 2
Z 1
0
1  FeM; (x)
1 + x
dx; (24)
where FeM; (x) is given by (25) in this page, which can be
easily obtained by following the proof of Theorem 2.
Based on Theorem 3 and (24), the ergodic secrecy rate
for the typical MBS transmission over the -th RB is lower
bounded as
RsM; =
h
CLM;   Ce

M;
i+
: (26)
Remark 3: From the results in (23), (24), and (26), we
establish that the ergodic secreay rate is improved by increas-
ing the number of MBS antennas, due to the fact that only the
served legitimate users can obtain the large array gains.
The area ergodic secrecy rate (in bits/s/m2) of the MBS tier
in the heterogeneous C-RAN is determined as
RsM = M (1  )KBoSRsM; : (27)
B. Secrecy Outage Probability
In the above, we have studied the secrecy capacity in the
massive MIMO aided heterogeneous C-RAN. Since Eves only
intercept the secrecy massages passively without any transmis-
sions, the channel state information (CSI) of the eavesdropping
channels cannot be obtained by the BSs or legitimate users.
In this circumstance, the BSs set the transmission rate R con-
sisting of the secrecy codewords and non-secrecy codewords,
and a constant rate of the secrecy codewords Rs (Rs  R).
Secrecy outage is declared when the targeted secrecy rate Rs
cannot be guaranteed.
61) Delay-Limited Mode: In the delay-limited mode, a rate
R is set under certain connection outage constraint. For RRH
transmission over the k-th RB allocated to the RRHs, given a
distance jX0;Rj = d0 between a typical RRH and its serving
user, the connection outage probability is given by
P coR;k (R) = Pr (log2 (1 + R;k) < R)
= 1  exp

 BoNo
PR
dRo
 
2R   1 : (28)
For RRH transmission over the -th RB shared by RRHs and
MBSs, the connection outage probability is
P coR; (R) = Pr (log2 (1 + R;) < R)
= 1  FR; jfjXo;Rj=dog
 
2R   1 ; (29)
where FR; jfjXo;Rj=xg () is given by (15).
Remark 4: From (28) and (29), we see that when a typical
RRH transmits information to its served user, deploying more
RRHs in its surrounding area has no effect on the quality of
connectivity, since the inter-RRH interference is mitigated.
Corollary 1. Given a distance jXo;Rj = do and the connection
outage probability threshold , the typical RRH transmission
rate over the k-th RB allocated to RRHs is given by
R = log2

1  PR
BoNod
R
o
ln (1  )

; (30)
and the typical RRH transmission rate over the -th RB shared
by RRHs and MBSs satisfies
R  log2

1 +
PRS
PMd
R
o

M
2
1

; (31)
with
1 =   M  (S) ln (1  )
2M
SP
=1
 
S


 

  2M

 

 + 2M + S
 :
(32)
Proof: A detailed proof is provided in Appendix D.
Similar to (29), given a distance jXo;Mj = do between a
typical MBS and its served user, we obtain the connection
outage probability of MBS transmission as
PcoM; (R) = 1  FM; jfjXo;Mj=dog
 
2R   1 ; (33)
where FM; jfjXo;Mj=dog () is the complementary cumulative
distribution function (CCDF) of the receive SINR M; at the
MBS. However, the exact expression for FM; jfjXo;Mj=dog ()
involves higher order derivatives of laplace transform using
Faa di Bruno’s formula [26], which becomes inefficient for
large number of MBS antennas. By the law of large numbers,
i.e., gM;  NM   S + 1 as NM is large, and employing
Gil-Pelaez theorem [27], we have
FM; jfjXo;Mj=dog () = Pr
 PM
S (NM   S + 1)d Mo
JM; + JR; +BoN1
> 

= Pr

JM; + JR; <
PM
S
(NM   S + 1)d Mo  BoN1

=
1
2
  1

Z 1
0
Im

e
 jw
 
PM
Sd
M
o 
(NM S+1) BoN1

' (w)

w
dw;
(34)
where j =
p 1, ' (w) is the conjugate of the characteristic
function given by (35) at the top of the next page, which
can be easily obtained by following the similar approach in
Appendix A. In (35), 2F1 [; ; ; ] is the Gauss hypergeometric
function [21, (9.142)].
Secrecy outage occurs when the equivocation rate of Eve
is lower than the secrecy rate Rs. Thus, the secrecy outage
probability can be written in a general form as
Ps = Pr

R  log2

1 + e

#;i

< Rs

= 1  Fe#;i
 
2R Rs   1 ; (36)
where Fe#;i () is the CDF of the SINR 
e
#;i at the most
malicious Eve. Note that here, Fe#;i () is given by (17), (19)
and (25) for RRH transmissions (# = R; i 2 fk; g) and MBS
transmissions (# = M; i = ), respectively.
Remark 5: From (36), we see that for eavesdroppers,
deploying more RRHs and MBSs results in more interference,
which degrades the eavesdropping channel, thereby decreasing
the secrecy outage probability.
2) Delay-Tolerant Mode: In the delay-tolerant mode, cod-
ing can be operated over a sufficient number of independent
channel realizations to experience the whole ensemble of the
channel, and therefore the transmission rate R can be set as
an arbitrary value less than or equal to the ergodic capacity
of the channel between the legitimate user and its serving
RRH/MBS [13]. The secrecy outage occurs when the targeted
ergodic secrecy rate Rs cannot be satisfied, i.e.,
R Re < Rs; (37)
where Re denotes the ergodic capacity of the most malicious
eavesdropper’s channel. When intercepting the RRH trans-
mission, Re = Ce

R;i(i 2 fk; g) given by (16) and (18)
respectively; and when intercepting the MBS transmission,
Re = C
e
M; given by (24). As mentioned in Remark 5, Re
decreases with increasing the densities of RRHs and MBSs,
due to more severe interference.
It is indicated from (37) that given a secrecy rate Rs, the
rate R should be set as large as possible to avoid the secrecy
outage. Based on Theorem 1, i) RRH transmission over the
k-th RB allocated to RRHs, the transmission rate R at RRH
(bits/s/Hz) satisfies R  CR;k with CR;k given by (13), and
ii) RRH transmission over the -th RB shared by the RRHs
and MBSs, R at RRH satisfies R  CR; with CR; given by
(14). Based on Theorem 3, for MBS transmission over the
-th RB shared by the RRHs and MBSs, The value for R at
MBS can be at least set as R = CLM; with C
L
M; given by
(23).
IV. ENERGY EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS
One of the 5G goals is to achieve 10x reduction in energy
consumption [28]. As such, EE is a very important perfor-
mance metric. In this section, we proceed to examine the EE
concern in the massive MIMO aided heterogeneous C-RAN.4
4Note that because the CSI of the eavesdropping channels is unknown, joint
design of combining both EE and secrecy is not feasible.
7' (w) = exp

  2R jwPRd
2 R
o
R   2 2F1

1;
R   2
R
; 2  2
R
; jwPRd Ro

  M2
SX
=1

S


jw
PM
S


  jwPMS  + 2M
M
B jw PMS d Mo 

  2
M
; 1  S

(35)
The EE for transmission from a typical RRH is given by
EERRH =
throughput
Power Consumption
=
KBo CR;k + (1  )KBo CR;
P totalR
; (38)
where CR;k and CR; are given by (13) and (14), respectively,
based on Theorem 1. In the RRH tier, transmission over RBs
that are only allocated to RRHs plays a dominant role in
the overall throughput [10], compared to using RBs shared
by the RRHs and MBSs. As a consequence, (38) can be
approximately evaluated as
EERRH
(a) Bo
CR;k
PR
"R
; (39)
where (a) is obtained by omitting the power consumptions
from static hardware and fronthaul link, compared to the RRH
transmit power. It is implied from (39) that the EE for RRH
transmission can be linearly improved by allocating more RBs
to the RRHs. From (13), we note that CR;k increases with
density of RRHs and MBSs. Hence we have the following
corollary:
Corollary 2. EE for RRH transmission is improved by in-
creasing the density of RRHs and MBSs in the heterogeneous
C-RAN, due to the fact that the distance between the user and
its associated RRH is shorter, hence increasing the throughput.
Likewise, the EE for transmission from a typical MBS can
at least achieve
EEMBS =
(1  )KBoS CLM;
P totalM
(b) BoS
CLM;
PM
"M
+
3P
=1

(S)

;0 + (S)
( 1)
NM;1
 ; (40)
where P totalM represents the total power consumption at each
MBS given by (12), (b) is obtained by the fact that the
power consumptions from static hardware and backhaul link
are negligible compared to the massive MIMO processing. In
(40), CLM; is given by (23), based on Theorem 3. From (40),
we see that S-FFR has negligible effect on the EE of MBS
transmission.
In light of the aforementioned, we conclude that the EE
of the massive MIMO enabled heterogeneous C-RAN is
improved by increasing the RRH density and RBs only used
by RRHs.
We next evaluate the EE of this network. Using the Theo-
rem 1 and Theorem 3 in Section III, we know that the EE
of the massive MIMO enabled heterogeneous C-RAN can at
lease achieve
EENet =
Area throughput of the network
Area Power Consumption of the network
=
RKBo CR;k + (1  )KBo
 
R CR; + MS C
L
M;

RP totalR + MP
total
M
:
(41)
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical results to evaluate the
secrecy and EE of the massive MIMO enabled heterogeneous
C-RAN (abbreviated as Het C-RAN in the figures). We
consider a circular region with radius 1  104 m (meter).
Such a network is assumed to operate at a carrier frequency
of 1 GHz, with the MBS transmit power PM = 40 dBm,
the RRH transmit power PR = 30 dBm, the RB bandwidth
B0 = 800 kHz, and the total number of RBs K = 25. The
power spectrum densities are N0 = N1 = Ne =  162
dBm [5]. The static hardware power consumption for RRH
and HPN are P 0R =0.1 W and P
0
M =10 W, respectively, and
the power consumption of the fronthaul link and backhaul
link are Pfh = Pbh = 0:2 W. We set the coefficients for
power consumption under ZFBF precoding in (12) as P 0M = 4
W, 1;0 = 4:8, 2;0 = 0, 3;0 = 2:08  10 8, 1;1 = 1,
2;1 = 9:5  10 8 and 3;1 = 6:25  10 8 [22]. In the
simulation results, the values of MBS and RRH density are
set based on the macro inter-site distance (ISD) in 3GPP
model [29].
A. The Effects of Massive MIMO
Fig. 2 analyzes the effects of massive MIMO on the area
ergodic secrecy rate. The analytical curves for area ergodic
secrecy rate of the RRH tier were obtained from (22), which
have a precise match to the results obtained using the Monte-
Carlo simulations marked by ‘’. The lower bound curves
for area ergodic secrecy rate of the MBS tier were obtained
from using (27), which can efficiently predict the performance
behavior. As mentioned in Remark 3 of Section III-A, we
observe that the area ergodic secrecy rate increases with the
number of MBS antennas, due to more array gains obtained
by the legitimate user. Increasing the number of served users
can also significantly improve the ergodic secrecy rate. The
area ergodic secrecy rate of the RRH tier remains unchanged
with increasing the number of MBS antennas, since employing
more MBS antennas will not cause more interference in the
network. Nevertheless, it will substantially increase with the
density of RRHs.
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Fig. 3 provides the results for the secrecy outage probability
and connection outage probability of MBS transmission oper-
ating in delay-limited mode. With increasing the number of
served users, the secrecy outage probability decreases and the
connection outage probability increases. The reason is that the
transmit power allocated to each user data stream decreases
when serving more users at the MBS, which in turn decreases
the receive SINR at both the legitimate user and eavesdroppers.
To decrease the connection outage probability without altering
the secrecy outage probability, MBSs can be equipped with
more antennas to provide larger array gains for the legitimate
users. In addition, it is obvious that more eavesdroppers will
deteriorate the secrecy performance.
Fig. 4 shows the ergodic capacity Ce

of the most malicious
eavesdropper’s channel and the ergodic capacity CM of the
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macrocell user’s channel for MBS transmission in delay-
tolerant mode. When adding more MBS antennas, Ce

is
unaltered and CM experiences a substantial increase, since
only the legitimate macrocell users can obtain the array gains.
Additionally, serving more users at the MBS decreases Ce

and CM, because of lower transmit power per user data stream
at the MBS as mentioned in Fig 3.
Fig. 5 illustrates the effects of massive MIMO on the EE.
Results indicate that the EE of MBS transmission is improved
by serving more users at the MBS, which is attributed to the
fact that more multiplexing gain is achieved. Although adding
more antennas at the MBS can provide a large array gain, there
is a significant increase in power consumption resulting from
massive MIMO baseband processing, which decreases the EE
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of MBS transmission. In addition, the RRHs achieve higher
EE than the MBSs, as they use lower transmit power and do
not consume power for baseband processing, and results also
demonstrate that massive MIMO has negligible effect on the
EE of RRH transmission.
B. The Effects of RRH Density
Fig. 6 shows the effects of RRH density on area ergodic
secrecy rate. We observe that when more RRHs are deployed,
there is a substantial increase in the area ergodic secrecy rate
of the RRH tier, as illustrated in Remark 2 of Section III-A.
The area ergodic secrecy rate of the MBS tier can also increase
with the density of RRH, since users with far-away MBSs
will be offloaded to the RRHs. RRH tier can achieve higher
area ergodic secrecy rate than the massive MIMO aided MBS
tier when the RRHs are denser than the MBSs. In addition,
slightly increasing the number of massive MIMO macrocells
brings large improvement in the area ergodic secrecy rate of
the MBS tier because more users can be served, and it also
improves the area ergodic secrecy rate of the RRH tier due to
the fact that users with far-away RRHs will be offloaded to
the MBSs.
Fig. 7 shows the secrecy outage probability and connection
outage probability of RRH transmission in delay-limited mode.
Specifically, Fig. 7(a) focuses on the performance when RRH
transmissions operate over the RBs only allocated to RRHs,
while Fig. 7(b) concentrates on the performance when RRH
transmissions operate over the RBs shared by RRHs and
MBSs. As stated in Remark 5 of Section III-B, the secrecy
outage probability experiences a massive decline when in-
creasing the density of RRHs, due to more severe interference
on the Eves but the connection outage probability is unaltered
since the inter-RRH interference is mitigated in the C-RAN,
as mentioned in Remark 4. Compared with the use of RBs
shared by RRHs and MBSs, RRH achieves better performance
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Fig. 7. Secrecy outage probability and connection outage probability for
RRH transmission in delay-limited mode.
by using the RBs only used by RRHs, due to the absence of
inter-tier interference in these RBs.
Fig. 8 shows the ergodic capacity Ce

of the most mali-
cious eavesdropper’s channel and the ergodic capacity CR of
the C-RAN user’s channel for RRH transmission in delay-
tolerant mode. As suggested in Remark 2, deploying more
RRHs can significantly decrease Ce

and increase CR. For
RRH transmission over the RB shared by RRHs and MBSs,
interference from the MBS tier has a large negative impact on
the performance at the legitimate users, however, its impact on
the degradation of the most malicious eavesdropper’s channel
is limited compared to more interference from dense RRHs.
Fig. 9 shows the effects of RRH density on the EE. As
mentioned in Corollary 2 of Section IV, when increasing the
density of RRHs, the EE of RRH transmission is significantly
improved. Increasing the density of MBSs improves the EE of
RRH transmission but decreases the EE of MBS transmission,
since users with far-away RRHs are offloaded to the MBSs.
The EE of the Het C-RAN decreases with increasing the
density of MBSs, due to the fact that power consumption of
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the network is significantly boosted by using more massive
MIMO MBSs. Since RRHs achieve higher EE, more RRHs
should be deployed in the Het C-RAN to enhance the EE.
C. The Effects of S-FFR
Results in Fig. 10 demonstrate the effects of S-FFR on area
ergodic secrecy rate. It is obvious that with more RBs allocated
to the RRHs, the area ergodic secrecy rate increases for the
RRH tier, and decreases for the MBS tier. The RRH tier can
achieve higher area ergodic secrecy rate than the MBS tier,
when the density of RRHs and the allocated RBs are large.
More importantly, it is implied that the effect of S-FFR on
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the area ergodic secrecy rate of the network can be distinct
depending on the RRH density.
Finally, Fig. 11 provides the effects of S-FFR on the EE.
As mentioned in section IV, the EE for RRH transmission is
indeed linearly improved by allocating more RBs to the RRHs
without the harm of inter-tier interference. S-FFR indeed has
little effect on the EE of MBS transmission. Therefore, the EE
of the network increases with the RRH density and RBs only
used by RRHs, as shown in this figure.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we investigated the physical layer secrecy and
EE in the two-tier massive MIMO aided heterogeneous C-
RAN, where massive MIMO empowered macrocell BSs and
11
RRHs coexist. The implementation of S-FFR was utilized to
suppress the inter-tier interference. We first studied the impacts
of massive MIMO and C-RAN on the secrecy performance
in terms of the area ergodic secrecy rate and secrecy outage
probability. Then we evaluated the EE in such networks. Our
results demonstrated that both C-RAN and massive MIMO
can significantly enhance the secrecy performance. The im-
plementation of C-RAN with low power cost RRHs improves
EE of the networks substantially.
APPENDIX A: A DETAILED DERIVATION OF THEOREM 1
When using the k-th RB allocated to the RRHs, the ergodic
capacity of the channel between the typical RRH and its served
user is given by
CR;k = E flog2 (1 + R;k)g
=
Z 1
0
EhR;k

log2

1 +
PR
BoNo
hR;kx
 R

fjXo;Rj (x) dx:
(A.1)
Considering that hR;k  exp(1), we further have
CR;k =
1
ln 2
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
1
1 + t
e
 BoNoPR x
R t
dt

fjXo;Rj (x) dx
=
1
ln 2
Z 1
0
e
BoNo
PR
xR
 

0;
BoNo
PR
xR

fjXo;Rj (x) dx;
(A.2)
where fjXo;Rj (x) is the probability density function (PDF) of
the distance between the typical RRH and its intended user,
using the similar approach in [30], fjXo;Rj (x) is given by
fjXo;Rj (x) =
2R
AR xe
 (R+M)x2 ; (A.3)
where AR = RR+M is the probability that a user is associated
with the RRH. By plugging (A.3) into (A.2), we get (13).
When using the -th RB shared by the RRHs and MBSs,
the ergodic capacity of the channel between the typical RRH
and its served user is given by
CR; = E flog2 (1 + R;)g
=
1
ln 2
Z 1
0
EjXo;Rj=x flog2 (1 + R;)g fjXo;Rj (x) dx
=
1
ln 2
Z 1
0
"Z 1
0
F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)
1 + 
d
#
fjXo;Rj (x) dx;
(A.4)
where FR; jfjXo;Rj=xg () is the CCDF of R; given a
distance jXo;Rj = x, which is calculated as
FR; jfjXo;Rj=xg () = Pr
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x
 R
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LIM;

1
PR
xR

; (A.5)
where LIM; () is the laplace transform of the PDF of IM; ,
and is given by
LIM; (s) = E
(
exp
(
 
 X
`2M
PM
S
h`; jX`;Mj M
!
s
))
(b)
= exp
(
 
Z 1
x
 
1  1 
1 + sPMS r
 M
S
!
M2rdr
)
(c)
= exp
 
 M2
SX
=1

S

Z 1
x
 
PM
S 

s (r M)
 
1 + sPMS r
 M
S rdr
!
= exp

  M2
SX
=1

S


s
PM
S

   sPMS  + 2M
M
B sPMS x M

  2
M
; 1  S

; (A.6)
where (b) is obtained by using the generating functional of
PPP [31], (c) results from using Binomial expansion, B() [; ]
is the incomplete beta function [21, (8.391)]. By pulling (A.6)
and (A.5) together, we get (15). Substituting (A.3) into (A.4),
we also get (14).
APPENDIX B: A DETAILED DERIVATION OF THEOREM 2
The ergodic capacity Ce

R;i (i 2 fk; g) of the most
malicious eavesdropper’s channel is written as
Ce

R;i = E
n
log2

1 + e

R;i
o
=
1
ln 2
Z 1
0
1  FeR;i (x)
1 + x
dx; (B.1)
where FeR;i (x) denotes the cumulative distribution function
(CDF) of e

R;i.
Based on (4), the CDF of e

R;k is calculated as
FeR;k
(x) = Pr

e

R;k < x

= Pr
 
max
e2e
(
PRh
e
R;k
Xeo;R R
IeR;k +BoNe
)
< x
!
= Ee
 Y
e2e
Pr
 
PRh
e
R;k
Xeo;R R
IeR;k +BoNe
< x je
!
: (B.2)
Using the generating functional of the PPP e, FeR;k (x) can
be further derived as
FeR;k
(x) = exp

  e
Z
R2

1  Pr
PRheR;kr R
IeR;k +BoNe
< x

dr
o
= exp

  e
Z
R2
ER

EM

exp
  rRx
PR
 
IeR;k +BoNe
 
dr

(a)
= exp

  2e
Z 1
0
exp
  rRx
PR
BoNe
LIeR;k rRxPR rdr

;
(B.3)
where (a) results from using the polar-coordinate system,
LIeR;k () is the laplace transform of the PDF of IeR;k.
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Likewise, the CDF of e

R; is calculated as
FeR;
(x) = Pr

e

R; < x

= Pr
 
max
e2e
(
PRh
e
R;
Xeo;R R
IeR; + I
e
M; +BoNe
)
< x
!
= Ee
 Y
e2e
Pr
 
PRh
e
R;
Xeo;R R
IeM; + I
e
R; +BoNe
< x je
!
= exp

  2e
Z 1
0
exp
  rRx
PR
BoNe

LIeR;
 rRx
PR
LIeM; rRxPR rdr

; (B.4)
where LIeR; () and LIeM; () are the laplace transforms of the
PDFs of IeR; and I
e
M; , respectively.
By using the Slivnyak’s theorem and the generating func-
tional of the PPP R, LIeR;i () (i 2 fk; g) is given by
LIeR;i (s) = E

exp
  sIeR;i	
= exp

 2R
Z 1
0

1  1
(1 + sPRr R)

rdr

= exp

 R (PR)
2
R  

1 +
2
R

 

1  2
R

s
2
R

:
(B.5)
Similarly, IeM; is given by
LIeM; (s) = exp
"
 2M
Z 1
0
 
1  1 
1 + sPMS r
 M
S
!
rdr
#
= exp

  2M
SX
=1

S


s
PM
S

 2
M
 

  2M

 

 + 2M + S

M  (S)

: (B.6)
Substituting (B.5) into (B.3), we get FeR;k () as (17). Then,
substituting (B.5) and (B.6) into (B.4), we get FeR; () as
(19).
APPENDIX C: A DETAILED DERIVATION OF THEOREM 3
The ergodic capacity of the channel between the typical
MBS and its served user is written as
CM; = E flog2 (1 + M;)g : (C.1)
By using Jensen’s inequality, a tight lower bound for CM; is
given by [25]
CLM; = log2
 
1 + eZ3+Z4

; (C.2)
where
Z3 = E

ln

PM
S
gM; jXo;Mj M

; (C.3)
and
Z4 = E

ln

1
JM; + JR; +BoN1

: (C.4)
We first calculate Z3 as
Z3 = ln

PM
S


+E fln (gM;)g   ME fln (jXo;Mj)g :
(C.5)
Considering that gM;    (NM   S + 1; 1), E fln (gM;)g is
given by
E fln (gM;)g =
Z 1
0
xNM Se x
(NM   S)! ln (x) dx
(a)
=  (NM   S + 1) ; (C.6)
where (a) results from using
R1
0
xv 1e x lnxdx =
 v  (v) ( (v)  ln) [21, (4.352.1)]. Then, E fln (jXo;Mj)g
is derived as
E fln (jXo;Mj)g
(b)
=
Z 1
0
ln (x) fjXo;Mj (x) dx
=
Z 1
0
ln (x)
2M
AM xe
 (R+M)x2dx
=
1
2
( (1)  ln ( (R + M))) : (C.7)
In (b) above, fjXo;Mj (x) is the PDF of the distance between
the typical MBS and its intended user, which can be directly
obtained following (A.3), and AM = MR+M is the probability
that a user is associated with the MBS. By substituting (C.6)
and (C.7) into (C.5), we obtain Z3 as
Z3 = ln

PM
S


+  (NM   S + 1)
  M
2
( (1)  ln ( (R + M))) : (C.8)
From (C.4), considering the convexity of ln

1
1+x

and
using Jensen’s inequality, we derive the lower bound on the
Z4 as
Z4  Z4 = ln

1
E fJM;g+ E fJR;g+BoN1

: (C.9)
Then, we have
E fJM;g =
Z 1
0
E
8<: X
`2M=o
PM
S
g`; jX`;Mj M
9=; fjXo;Mj (x) dx
(c)
=
Z 1
0

PM2M
Z 1
x
r1 Mdr

fjXo;Mj (x) dx
=
PM2M 
 
2  M2

(M   2) (M + R)1 
M
2
; (C.10)
where (c) results from using Campbell’s theorem [32]. Like-
wise, E fJR;g is calculated as
E fJR;g =
Z 1
0
E
8<:X
j2R
PRgj; jXj;Rj R
9=; fjXo;Mj (x) dx
=
PR2R 
 
2  R2

(R   2) (M + R)1 
R
2
: (C.11)
Substituting (C.8) and (C.9) into (C.2), we obtain (23).
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APPENDIX D: A DETAILED DERIVATION OF COROLLARY 1
When the connection outage constraint P coR;k (R) = , using
(28), we can easily get (30).
For connection outage constraint on the RRH transmis-
sion over the -th RB shared by RRHs and MBSs, namely
P coR; (R) = , we have
FR; jfjXo;Rj=dog
 
2R   1 = 1  : (D.1)
Since the noise can be ignored compared with the inter-tier
interference from MBSs, based on (A.5) and (A.6), we con-
sider the worse case that interferers are located everywhere in
the plane and derive the lower bound for FR; jfjXo;Rj=dog ()
as
FLR; jfjXo;Rj=dog ()
= exp
8><>: 
Z 1
0

1  1
1 + PMd
R
o 
PRS
r M
SM2rdr
9>=>;
= exp

  2M

PMd
R
o
PRS

 2
M
SX
=1

S


 

  2M

 

 + 2M + S

M  (S)

: (D.2)
Substituting (D.2) into (D.1), after some manipulations, we
obtain (31).
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